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Introduction
Health technology assessment (HTA) is a form of policy research
that examines short- and long-term consequences of the applica-
tion of a health-care technology. Properties assessed include evi-
dence of safety, efﬁcacy, patient-reported outcomes, real-world
effectiveness, cost, and cost-effectiveness as well as social, legal,
ethical, and political impacts [1].
At least ﬁve distinct activities deﬁne a formal health technology
assessment process: 1) horizon scanning; 2) topic determination
and queuing; 3) collection and assessment of evidence; 4)
appraisal; and 5) funding and policy implementation. Horizon
scanning involves the early examination and active monitoring of
emerging technology to determine, in part, potential evidence
requirements, and budgetary implications. Topic determination
and queuing activities focus on setting priorities and sequencing of
emerging and previously considered technologies for assessment
or reassessment. The assessment function entails the process of
collecting, evaluating, and systematically reviewing all available
evidence for the technology under consideration. Appraisal is the
decision-making function and is often distinguished by an external
body (e.g., a pharmacy and therapeutics committee in the United
States) that considers and weighs the summarized evidence in
order to render a recommendation to the payer. Funding and
policy implementation are the ﬁnal steps in the HTA process.
The explicit objective of organizations that operate formal
HTA programs is to carefully consider a full range of clinical and
economic evidence in order to render decisions as to the accep-
tance, modiﬁcation, or rejection of technologies on a rational
basis [2]. The UK National Health Service National Coordinat-
ing Center for HTA suggests that HTA programs directly con-
sider the following attributes of health technology as they
undertake their mission: When compared with existing alterna-
tives, does the technology work, in whom does the technology
work, and what is the cost impact? [3].
The funding for and use of health technology assessment
programs in the United States has a long and storied history, is
fragmented and uncoordinated, and includes both public and
private sector initiatives. Some readers will be surprised to learn
that a number of US HTA programs predate the development of
well-known international efforts in Australia (Pharmaceutical
Beneﬁts Advisory Committee), Canada (Canadian Agency for
Drugs and Technologies in Health), Sweden (Swedish Council on
Technology Assessment in Health Care) and the United Kingdom
(National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [NICE]).
Regrettably, a number of these early US initiatives have been
discontinued or have been substantially altered in large part
because of political, ﬁnancial and commercial pressures.
In this article, we consider the changing landscape for system-
atic health technology assessment in the United States and what it
means for health-care payers. In Section I, we start with a descrip-
tion of the many public and private agencies supplying and using
health technology assessment reports to make coverage and reim-
bursement decisions. In Section II, against a backdrop of escalat-
ing costs and few restrictions on the pricing and use of health-care
technology,we discuss the factors that are shaping and challenging
private and public sectorHTA programs. Finally, in Section III, we
offer commentary on the potential role that a more formal
approach to HTA can play in health care in the United States.
SECTION I: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
AGENCIES PRODUCING OR USING
HTA REPORTS INTHE UNITED STATES
Federal Health Technology Assessment Initiatives
The federal government has provided substantial ﬁnancial
support for health technology assessments since the early 1970s.
The mechanisms by which the US government has funded HTA
have changed over this time period, largely because of the policy
decisions in the legislative and executive branches.
The Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment. The nonpartisan Con-
gressional Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment (OTA) was estab-
lished in 1972 with funding by the US Congress to undertake
technology assessments to inform federal funding decisions
about emerging health and nonhealth technology. The OTA was
commissioned to evaluate technologies as requested by Congres-
sional members and committees on matters related to legislative
policies that were either undergoing development or review. At
its peak, the OTA staff produced upwards of 50 reports annually.
The publicly available HTA reports were comprehensive and
often described multiple policy options as well as the costs and
consequences of each option. Congress withdrew funding for the
OTA in 1995, in part because of controversy over the content of
several of its reports and political pressure from the commercial
health technology industries [4].
Medicare and Medicaid. The Medicare and Medicaid programs
are the largest government-sponsored purchasers of health care
in the United States. Together, these programs provide medical
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care coverage for more than 60 million individuals. In 2006,
Medicaid and Medicare spending totaled $288 billion and $374
billion, respectively [5]. The majority of services for beneﬁciaries
of these programs are provided by hospitals and health-care
institutions, physicians, and pharmacies. The Medicare program
provides a comprehensive beneﬁts package for US citizens age 65
years and above. Beginning in 2007 with the implementation of
the Part D program, Medicare became the largest purchaser of
outpatient pharmaceuticals. The Medicaid programs for the indi-
gent and disabled are jointly ﬁnanced by states and the federal
government. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) is the federal agency responsible for program oversight,
ﬁnancing and implementation.
Health technology assessment within the Medicare and
Medicaid programs is complicated and ﬂuid. Coverage determi-
nations for Medicare-ﬁnanced medical technology can be made
at the local or national level (national coverage decisions super-
sede local decisions). Here we discuss only the national coverage
determination process.
The Medicare Coverage Division within CMS is responsible
for undertaking or commissioning HTA reports to support con-
siderations for a national coverage determination [6]. The Medi-
care Evidence Development and Coverage Advisory Committee,
an appointed body of national experts on medical technology, is
tasked with weighing the evidence from the HTA in an open,
public meeting. The evidence dossiers, public submissions of
evidence from technology manufacturers, and the ﬁnal coverage
policies are placed on the CMS web site (http://www.cms.
hhs.gov/mcd) for transparency. Coverage determinations are
issued by staff within the Coverage Division through a National
Coverage Decision memorandum. Notably, the Coverage Divi-
sion is explicitly prohibited by law from considering evidence
relating to the cost or cost-effectiveness of technologies when
making coverage determinations [7].
Operating separately from the CMS Coverage Division, the
Medicare Part D outpatient drug program was established as a
publicly funded yet privately administered beneﬁt. The conse-
quence of such a public–private program is that all pharmaceu-
tical coverage and reimbursement decisions are made by Part D
contractors. Medicare regulations regarding coverage for par-
ticular drugs and drug classes, however, limit the ﬂexibility of
Part D contractors’ drug beneﬁt designs. Some have questioned
the rigor and transparency of private-sector HTA efforts to
support formulary listing in the Medicare Part D program. We
discuss in depth the private-sector HTA activities later in this
article.
Many state Medicaid programs support HTA activities for
pharmaceuticals and other medical technologies. Typically, these
HTA programs are administered by local program staff with
support from clinical experts. Rarely are state Medicaid employ-
ees trained in technology assessment or resource allocation
decision-making methods. To support these local efforts, state
programs often purchase HTA’s from private organizations that
specialize in this area. In general, the operating budgets for
state-sponsored HTA activities—which largely come from the
state rather than the federal government—are insufﬁcient for the
workload. On the one hand, observers may see multiple state
HTA programs as redundant and inefﬁcient, often creating
inconsistencies in coverage policies between states. On the other
hand, variable state coverage policies may reﬂect local health-
care needs, state-speciﬁc resource constraints, and policy agendas
of elected ofﬁcials.
Drug Effectiveness Review Project. In 2001, the Oregon Health
and Sciences University created the Drug Effectiveness Review
Project (DERP) to produce evidence syntheses of pharmaceutical
products to support decision-making for the Oregon Medicaid
Preferred Drug List (http://www.ohsu.edu/drugeffectiveness/).
Oregon Health and Science University scientists envisaged DERP
as a program that could serve multiple state Medicaid drug
programs in an effort to reduce redundancy and support consis-
tency in the evaluation of evidence to support formulary listing
[8].
Currently, DERP has contracts with 14 Medicaid programs
to supply evidence reports on pharmaceuticals. These publicly
available reports contain a description of the HTA questions, a
listing and synthesis of the supporting literature and a recom-
mendation on the quality of available evidence. Evidence con-
cerning the cost and cost-effectiveness of drugs is not included in
the evidence summaries. Importantly, the reports do not contain
a coverage or funding recommendation to the state Medicaid
program and thus, states may reach different conclusions using
the same evidence reports regarding speciﬁc pharmaceuticals or
therapeutic classes. In addition to informing their drug coverage
policies, states sometimes use evidence from the DERP reports to
negotiate prices with manufacturers.
There is no shortage of controversy surrounding the DERP
program [9]. The pharmaceutical industry has criticized DERP
reports as providing “political cover” for cost-containment deci-
sions taken by state Medicaid programs. Others have expressed
concern that DERP’s selection of evidence is too strict and effec-
tively eliminates available research that would inform coverage
policies [10]. In particular, this strict standard of evidence limits
the usefulness of agencies such as DERP in providing rapid initial
assessments of newly emerging technologies; as such technologies
rarely arrive with sufﬁcient published evidence meeting the stan-
dard to support a conclusion as to the technology’s appropriate
role in medical practice.
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. The Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) historically has been
the largest federal funder of publicly available health technology
assessments in the United States. The AHRQ supports HTA
research primarily through three external research networks
coordinated within the Agency’s Effective Healthcare Program:
1) The Evidence-Based Practice Centers (EPCs); 2) the Centers
for Education and Research on Therapeutics (CERT); and 3) the
Developing Evidence to Inform Decisions about Effectiveness
(DEcIDE) Program. These three programs conduct systematic
evidence reviews to assess the effectiveness, comparative effec-
tiveness, safety, and, in rare instances, the cost-effectiveness of
medical technologies and interventions. HTA topics are nomi-
nated by a mix of federal and nonfederal partners, may or may
not include comparative effectiveness or cost-effectiveness ques-
tions, and generally take between 15 and 18 months to complete.
Once ﬁnished, the HTA reports are published on the agency’s
web site (http://www.ahrq.gov) and disseminated in print. The
hope is that AHRQ technology assessment reports would be
widely used to inform coverage decisions. However, timing and
relevance to private sector payers have limited their usefulness.
The AHRQ’s technology assessment activities are continu-
ously challenged by political pressures that translate directly into
funding decisions [11]. To illustrate how political forces have
inﬂuenced resources allocated to the agency for these programs,
one only has to look to recent federal legislation. The DEcIDE
program was established to support Section 1013 of the Medi-
care Modernization Act—the legislation that gave rise to the
outpatient prescription drug program for Medicare beneﬁciaries
(Medicare Part D). Section 1013 authorized AHRQ to conduct
and support research on the outcomes, comparative clinical
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effectiveness, and appropriateness of pharmaceuticals, devices,
and health-care services. Whereas the MMA authorized an
annual budget of $50 million, AHRQ was ultimately appropri-
ated $15 million per year for these activities. Furthermore,
Section 1013 prohibits the CMS—the federal agency responsible
for the Medicare Part D program—from using information pro-
duced by the DEcIDE program to withhold or restrict access to
pharmaceuticals.
Of the agency’s approximately $350 million annual budget,
only a small fraction goes to the production of health technology
assessments. The future of AHRQ and federally-sponsored HTA
would change dramatically if the US Congress approves funding
for a proposed comparative effectiveness center [12].
Other federal programs. The Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) Pharmacy Beneﬁts Management Strategic Healthcare
Group (PBMSHG) undertakes pharmaceutical technology assess-
ments to support the appropriate use of medications within the
VA health-care system. The HTAs are developed by internal
experts and are used to inform national drug formulary place-
ment, treatment guidelines, and contracting decisions. In an
effort to promote transparency, the HTAs for a number of thera-
peutic class reviews are published on the PBMSHG Web site
although in some cases conﬁdential information is unavailable
and in no case are prices revealed (http://www.pbm.va.gov).
The Military Health System is supported in its mission to
improve the clinical and economic outcomes of drug therapy
through the Department of Defense PharmacoEconomic Center
(PEC). PEC internal staff undertakes comprehensive cost-
effectiveness studies of existing and new pharmaceuticals to
support the decision-making processes of the DOD Pharmacy
and Therapeutics Committee, the National Mail Order Phar-
macy formulary list, and in some instances, the VA. Public access
to PEC reports is limited (http://www.pec.ha.osd.mil), but what
is available for evaluation suggests that the HTA reports are
strictly limited to comparative economic analyses [13].
National Institutes of Health. The National Institutes of Health
does not have a program for conducting health technology
assessments of medical interventions, but often will conduct evi-
dence reviews in the process of developing clinical practice poli-
cies for particular medical conditions. For example, the National
Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute support the National Choles-
terol Education Program (NCEP). The NCEP panel of experts
reviews evidence regarding cholesterol and coronary artery
disease, and produces treatment guidelines in the process of
making its recommendations for the evaluation and management
of hypercholesterolemia. Similar evidence reviews have been pro-
duced for asthma, emphysema, and many other diseases.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Although the FDA has
been the primary federal agency of drug safety and efﬁcacy for
decades, this agency does not conduct formal technology assess-
ments. Instead, FDA staff evaluates prelicensing studies of safety
and efﬁcacy submitted by manufacturers in support of their new
drug applications. Cost-effectiveness analysis lies outside the
deﬁned scope of these reviews, and in general, the FDA has
focused on Phase 3 placebo-controlled trials as the gold standard
of evidence, as opposed to head-to-head trials against the most
appropriate active comparator.
Private Sector Health Technology Assessment Initiatives
The commercial health insurance market ﬁnances medical care
services for more than 200 million individuals through diverse
employer-sponsored and self-insured health beneﬁts programs.
The ﬁve largest health insurers (Aetna, Cigna, Kaiser Perma-
nente, United Healthcare, and WellPoint) cover or are respon-
sible for >50% of all employer-sponsored members in the United
States. The Pharmacy Beneﬁts Management (PBM) industry is
even more concentrated. Roughly 95 percent of all persons with
drug coverage receive pharmaceutical beneﬁts through a PBM.
The four largest PBMs (Caremark, Medco, Express Scripts, and
WellPoint NextRx) process nearly 70% of the 3 billion prescrip-
tions dispensed annually. Many private insurers and PBMs have
sizeable HTA programs staffed by qualiﬁed clinical experts and
ﬁnancial analysts and supported by sophisticated data systems.
The level of HTA work performed by other US private health
plans is variable in terms of HTA processes such as formal
evidence synthesis, evaluation of pharmacoeconomic analyses
when such are available, and a pharmacy and therapeutics com-
mittee or other expert decision-making panel whose members are
not employed by the health plan and are screened for ﬁnancial
conﬂicts of interest. Smaller health plans have much more limited
stafﬁng and often depend on technology assessments produced
by outside private or public agencies. Plan size is not necessarily
correlated with the quality of its processes, as has been described
[14].
Very little information is available regarding the scope, inter-
nal processes and conduct of HTA’s by private insurers and
PBMs. WellPoint does make its HTA Guidelines publicly avail-
able on its websites. However, most other private organizations
generally view their HTA programs as proprietary, offering a
competitive advantage over each other in a marketplace that
demands effective cost control. Recently and in response to con-
sumers, private payers have provided information on the extent
of medical and pharmaceutical product reimbursement on their
websites, allowing consumers to compare and contrast coverage
policies between competing plans; however, the process by which
these decisions are taken is usually not transparent.
SECTION II: FACTORS SHAPING PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC SECTOR HTA PROGRAMS IN
THE UNITED STATES
The Academy of Managed Care Pharmacy Format
Historically, the relationship between technology manufacturers
and health-care purchasers has been strained. Manufacturers
complain that insurers coverage and reimbursement policies are
arbitrary or opaque, whereas insurers often charge that manu-
facturers charge exorbitant prices and are not forthcoming with
all available evidence on products. In response, the Academy of
Managed Care Pharmacy (AMCP) produced its ﬁrst guidance
document on evidence requirements to support formulary listing
in 2000. The intent of the AMCP Format was to provide a
framework and evidence tool for private and public payers to
request appropriate clinical and economic data to support
coverage and reimbursement deliberations.
Additionally, the AMCP Format solved a failure of the
market to provide information that would improve decision-
making and contracting. Federal regulations enforced by the
FDA restrict the promotion, and therefore dissemination of drug
evidence to that contained within the approved product label
[15,16]. Historically, this meant that when evidence was avail-
able on product safety, beneﬁt, or cost-effectiveness but was not
contained within the approved label, it could not be shared with
the payer without an explicit request. Health insurers may ﬁnd
such information to be valuable for decision-making, but would
not necessarily identify it, either because of resource constraints
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or because the data would not be found through systematic
review of the literature. To solve this problem, if a health pro-
fessional or payer speciﬁcally requests clinical evidence, data or
economic studies not contained within the approved label, the
pharmaceutical company can supply the information so long as
the request was unprompted—an unsolicited request. The AMCP
Format in effect created a safe harbor for the transmission of a
much larger body of evidence regarding pharmaceuticals from
manufacturers to payers.
By lowering the transaction cost of acquiring a more com-
plete evidence picture on pharmaceutical products, it was anti-
cipated that the AMCP Format would “jumpstart” more
formalized assessments of pharmaceuticals within the private
payer organizations. The AMCP Format is not compulsory, but
voluntary. Adopting payers number more than 50 and include
many of the largest private insurers and PBMs. The evidence and
reporting requirements of the AMCP Format have been revised
twice since adoption and the most recent version (v2.1) can be
found on the AMCP web site (http://www.amcp.org).
Introduction of the AMCP Format initially was met with
resistance by the pharmaceutical industry and a small number of
payers. Industry was concerned over possible legal issues stem-
ming from the unsolicited request process as well as the cost of
producing evidence dossiers. Some manufacturers questioned the
expertise of smaller payers with limited stafﬁng to perform rig-
orous reviews. Payers expressed unease regarding availability
of implementation resources, speciﬁcally resources to support
appropriate stafﬁng to review the information provided in the
dossiers. Others were concerned about the quality and complete-
ness of clinical and economic evidence received directly from
industry. Recent research supports continuing concern about evi-
dence quality in industry submissions to US payers [17].
The AMCP Format provided for a uniform listing of evidence
requirements for drug formulary considerations of private payers
in the United States. The drafters of the Format expected that
payers would customize the evidence requirements tool within
the Format to meet speciﬁc HTA program needs. Although the
AMCP Format does not necessarily encourage insurers to
develop their own HTA programs, it can result in an assessment
process that is closer to the spirit and substance of a formal HTA.
Organizations with robust HTA departments also beneﬁt from
the manufacturer dossiers. DERP, the VA, and the Department of
Defense PEC are notable examples of HTA programs that tai-
lored the Format for their own unique requirements. However
the Format is included in the HTA process, its effective use
depends on a mutual understanding on the part of the manufac-
turer and the health plan that the Format is a tool to facilitate
communication between the two parties. As such, it will not be
optimally effective unless both participate actively in the process.
When properly understood, it serves as a vehicle through which
the plan can request speciﬁc types of information for the review
and the manufacturer can respond by providing information and
analysis to support the drug’s value proposition in ways that will
be meaningful to the plan’s reviewers.
WellPoint Health Technology Assessment Guidelines
WellPoint is one of the largest private health plans in the United
States, providing health beneﬁts to more than 35 million com-
mercial, Medicare, and Medicaid clients, and is widely viewed as
a leader in innovative pharmacy beneﬁt programs. On October 9,
2008, WellPoint released its revised set of evidence requirements
for pharmaceutical technology assessments to improve transpar-
ency to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries regard-
ing the type of data the company is looking for in order to make
value-based, health-care decisions on drug therapy for its
members. The WellPoint Outcomes-Based Formulary process
will include speciﬁc requirements for: 1) new products, new
indications, and new formulations; and 2) reevaluation of prod-
ucts, indications and formulations. The revised guidelines
emphasize budgetary impact projections and potential medical
cost offsets based on the drug company claims regarding the
product, employee productivity effects, usefulness, and validity
assessment of clinical trials, a recommendation that the drug
company product claims allow for monitoring and validation
over short and medium time frames (3 years recommended), and
effects on patient-reported outcomes and quality of life).
SECTION III: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT INTHE
UNITED STATES: LESSONS LEARNED
Health insurers in the United States will continue to be chal-
lenged by the need to balance access to effective new medical
technologies against the impact that these technologies are
having on the cost of medical care. On one side is the steady
proliferation of high cost new technologies, combined with pres-
sures by patients, clinicians, and advocacy groups to adopt these
technologies. On the other are health-care purchasers, who are
ﬁnding it increasingly difﬁcult to bear the cost of providing health
insurance for their employees and members. The principles of
HTA will be the foundation on which payers will balance the
competing objectives of access and affordability, so that coverage
of older technologies that are supported by solid evidence is not
jeopardized. HTA has evolved over time, and will continue to
change in response to the changing needs of decision-makers.
After brieﬂy summarizing lessons learned from early attempts at
using HTA, we will discuss issues that we feel will shape the
future of HTA in the United States.
HTA and Clinical Practice Guidelines
Decision-makers have learned much from their early experiences
with HTA. Initial applications of HTA frequently involved incor-
poration of evidence reviews into relatively inﬂexible clinical
practice guidelines. The evidence appraisal systems that were
used to create these guidelines were often ad hoc and based on
the guideline creators’ interpretation of what constituted higher
and lower quality evidence. Many were not transparent as to
their methods. As a result, there was rapid proliferation of
hundreds of “evidence-based guidelines” that often contained
conﬂicting recommendations. This proliferation of numerous
guidelines of highly variable quality created a backlash among
clinicians, patient advocacy groups, and even some payer groups.
In response, thought leaders in the evidence-based medicine
movement responded by describing the core principles of evi-
dence appraisal, at the same time emphasizing that decision-
makers needed ﬂexibility in using many types of evidence for
patient care and practice policy. In particular, David Sackett,
Brian Haynes, and colleagues clearly articulated both the need to
have clear standards for evidence appraisal and the means to
synthesize evidence from a number of sources [18]. As a result,
highly directive clinical practice guidelines were replaced with
evidence summaries that were more uniform in their evaluation
of available information. Many publicly and privately funded
organizations—including several based in Europe, Canada, and
Australia—now use more uniform evidence appraisal methods.
The evidence summary reports by organizations such as the
Cochrane Collaboration, UK-NICE, DERP, and the CADTH
now are more similar than they are distinct. As a result, decision-
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makers in the United States have begun to rely on these sources
in their HTA processes, and are thus less prone to develop ad hoc
or nontransparent approaches to evidence appraisal.
Timeliness and Efﬁcacy versus Effectiveness
Although the HTA process has become more uniform and ﬂexible
over time, several challenges remain. The producers ofHTA’s have
been criticized for being too slow in producing reviews for the
needs of decision-makers, for relying too heavily on evidence from
randomized controlled trials, and for ignoring interventions that
are supported by less rigorous forms of evidence. One important
issue is the difference between evidence that is needed for regula-
tory approval to market a product and the needs of end users. For
example, amajor limiting factor in theHTAprocess is the fact that
most drugs come to market with evidence of efﬁcacy based on
placebo controlled trials. Differences between trials—including
the patient populations, management of conditions, and end
points chosen for study—limit the comparability of drugs within
classes used to treat the same condition. When is a new
agent—with its attendant claims of superiority in one or more
clinical domains—truly incrementally better than current thera-
pies? Furthermore, are the additional costs of the new agent
justiﬁable given these purported beneﬁts? Questions such as these
have spurred the current health policy debate towards the devel-
opment programs that would conduct prospective “head-to-
head” clinical trials comparing the effectiveness of new and
existing treatments. This movement, now dubbed “comparative
effectiveness,” is often envisioned as both entirely government
ﬁnanced and run or as public-private conﬁgurations (e.g., private
centers funded by federal, state, and private sources).
Comparative Effectiveness Programs
Comparative effectiveness programs would move HTA into a
new realm; speciﬁcally, toward the creation of evidence that is
designed to be directly applicable to clinical decision-making
rather than the synthesis and appraisal of existing evidence. A
primary motivation for insisting on comparative effectiveness is
the recognition that this information will otherwise never be
generated by either manufacturers or the public sector. Although
comparative effectiveness studies would address many important
HTA issues, these studies still have important limitations. High
quality comparative effectiveness studies would be costly and
potentially of long duration, thus limiting the number that would
be available to inform decisions over time. In addition, the clini-
cal questions most comparative effectiveness studies would pose
would focus on improving care and patient outcomes rather than
rather than reducing cost. In addition, selective enrollment may
limit the generalizability of these studies.
Coverage with Evidence Development
Another movement within the health insurance community with
implications for the HTA ﬁeld is commonly termed coverage with
evidence development (CED). At its core, coverage with evidence
posits that the evidence generated to support regulatory approval
of a product is sometimes insufﬁcient to support coverage and
reimbursement in general or selected clinical settings. This “evi-
dence gap” arises because the design of the trial(s) supporting the
product are considered to be of poor quality (e.g., nonrandom-
ized designs) or because the patient population and clinical
experimental setting does not represent the way the technology
appears to be used in practice. In either case, coverage with
evidence development is an attempt by the insurance community
to permit reimbursement of the technology with the condition
that additional evidence is gathered systematically—typically
either in the form of prospective registries or prospective, con-
trolled clinical trials—to better understand its risks and beneﬁts
relative to alternatives. The CMS’ Coverage with Evidence
Development (CED) program is at the forefront of this move-
ment in the United States [19]. Under CED, a new technology is
granted provisional reimbursement while evidence is generated
through a clinical research protocol. The protocol may take the
form of an observational study, or at the opposite extreme, a
prospective randomized clinical trial. A ﬁnal coverage decision
on the new technology would be issued only after the evidence
has been reported. The National Emphysema Treatment Trial
was an early application of coverage with evidence. Here, an
experimental technology known as lung volume reduction
surgery was covered by CMS only for patients who agreed to
participate in a trial where they were randomized to either the
surgery or usual medical care. The trial was completed in 2005,
and CMS modiﬁed its coverage to ﬁt the ﬁndings of the study
[20].
Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds
Some HTA procedures that have been implemented overseas are
unlikely to be replicated in the United States. First, explicit use of
cost-effectiveness thresholds is unlikely because of the complexity
of health-care delivery, with multiple competing private health
insurers and political resistance among public health insurers to
explicitly incorporate treatment costs into their decision-making
policies. Second, simulation modeling—which is used in the
United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries to address prob-
lems where evidence is unavailable—continues to meet resistance
among clinicians and policymakers in the United States. Third,
the centralization of HTA that has occurred in much of the world
is unlikely to be replicated in the United States, also because of
the fact that health-care ﬁnancing is not centralized.
Conclusions
Health technology assessment will continue to evolve to accom-
modate the needs of health insurers. It will always be shaped in
part by the political landscape that will in turn be inﬂuenced by
public perceptions of HTA as either a system that improves
patient care or simply restricts access to promising medical tech-
nologies. Such perceptions will inﬂuence the level of public
ﬁnancing of HTA, but they will not change the real need that
payers have for controlling health spending at the same time
ensuring access to effective medical technologies. The medical
technology industries will need to grapple with the seeming
paradox of meeting regulatory and licensing requirements while
building an evidence-base necessary to satisfy health-care payers.
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